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Abstract
Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an at-
tempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality. Speci-
cally, they suggest that when the evidence for p is sucient but not conclusive, it would be
rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they hold that we can in these cases
eectively decide to form either attitude without irrationality. This paper argues against
the version of epistemic permissivism (“Discretion”) invoked by these writers and shows
that other defensible permissivisms do not support their cause. It proceeds as follows. §1
introduces the issue. §2 undermines two arguments for Discretion and uses some lessons
from their failure to mount an argument against Discretion. §3 presents a further argument
against Discretion. §4 oers an error theory to explain our misguided attraction to Discre-
tion. §5 explains why other defensible permissivisms do not help to support the view that
we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality.
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1 Discretion and its Role in the Ethics of Belief
When evidence is inconclusive a gap is thought to open for the will to operate.
—Adler (2002: 111)
Consider a familiar question: to what extent can we control our doxastic attitudes? It is un-
controversial that we can sometimes indirectly control them via deviant processes like self-
deception and non-deviant processes like reconsideration of the evidence or gathering of new
evidence.1 But could we ever directly execute a decision to form a doxastic attitude? Many
have thought not—some on normative grounds, some on conceptual grounds, and some on
psychological grounds.2 A few have claimed that it is conceivable for a person to directly exe-
cute a decision to form a doxastic attitude, though the cases oered involve people with deviant
psychologies.3 But such cases aord slim vindication of direct doxastic control. An interesting
form of direct doxastic control, one might think, wouldn’t require epistemic irrationality.
With that thought in mind, recent writers have sought to defend a more interesting form
of direct doxastic control by invoking a version of the thesis that epistemic rationality gives
us options. Specically, these writers think that when the evidence for p is sucient but not
conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to suspend judgment on p, and they argue
that we can in some of these cases directly execute a decision to form one of these attitudes
without any epistemic irrationality. The most recent defenders of this suggestion are Frankish
(2007), Nickel (2010), and McHugh (2013). Nickel (2010: 312–2) writes that:
[a] person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position
voluntarily to acquire belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. [. . . ] The fact
that there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic option, together with the reasons-
responsiveness of the belief that p, together make it plausible that the formation of the belief that
p is voluntary.
1Cf. Alston (1988) and Feldman (2000).
2See Williams (1973), Scott-Kakures (1994), and Adler (2002) for normative and conceptual arguments, and Alston
(1988), Curley (1975) and Feldman (2000) for (broadly) psychological arguments.
3See, for example, Bennett (1990)’s example of the Credamites.
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In a similar vein, Frankish (2007: 541) says:
[T]here is a distinction between reasons that are sucient to permit belief and reasons that are
sucient to compel it. There are propositions for which we have sucient reason in the former
sense but not in the later, and it is in relation to such propositions [...] that active belief formation
can be practiced.
Similar thoughts can be found in McHugh (2013: 6–7). The suggestion also appears in earlier
writers. In attacking Williams’s argument against direct doxastic control, Raz (1999: 9) wrote:
There are many cases in which there are reasons to believe a proposition which are not decisive,
meaning that while they make it rational to believe it, they do not make it irrational to withhold
belief. In such cases just as our choices (when underdetermined by reason) reveal our character
and tastes so do our beliefs. [. . . ] In this, coming to believe is analogous to choosing.
Ginet (2001) also appealed to such examples in defense of direct doxastic control. And as Adler
(2002: 59-63) suggests, the idea goes back to James (1896/1979), who held that with respect to
some propositions that cannot be settled by the evidence, we can “lawfully” will to believe.4
Although there are important dierences between the views of these writers, a common
underlying argument unites them. This argument can be put as follows:
The Argument from Discretion
(1: Discretion) There are cases where it would be epistemically rational for a person either to
believe p or to be agnostic on p given her total evidence E.
(2) If there are such cases, then an epistemically rational subject would have the ability to decide
to form either attitude in many of them.
(3) Having this ability would constitute a signicant form of direct doxastic control.
(4) So, there are cases in which we can exercise a signicant form of direct doxastic control.
Ginet, Frankish, Nickel, McHugh, and Raz embrace (1) and (2) for similar reasons. They dis-
agree, however, about why (3) is true. This is because they disagree about exactly what a
signicant kind of direct doxastic control would involve.
Ginet, Frankish and Nickel think that the signicant kind of control we get in the relevant
cases is direct voluntary control. By contrast, McHugh and Raz aren’t seeking to vindicate
direct voluntary control, though they think we can in a dierent sense exercise direct doxas-
tic control. Indeed, McHugh elsewhere argues that having direct voluntary control over our
doxastic attitudes would undermine our doxastic freedom.5 The signicant kind of control
that McHugh and Raz think we get is better described as a kind of autonomy. We wouldn’t be
manifesting autonomy if we could will to form a belief for reasons we took to be bad or for no
reason at all. But if epistemic rationality gives us options, it is not implausible that we could
exercise autonomy by deciding to believe rather than to suspend (or vice versa).6
For our purposes, it does not matter which explanation of (3) is correct. What matters
is that for everyone involved, the kind of doxastic control allegedly secured is a kind that
4Though as Adler stresses (2002: 63), the cases that interested James were ones where the absence of decisive
evidence wasn’t merely a temporary limitation; other voluntarists “want the blessing to extend much farther”.
5See McHugh (2014). Cf. Hieronymi (2008).
6One might think that using the word “decide” implicates the will, in which case McHugh and Raz would not
strictly speaking accept (2). But using the word “decide” needn’t implicate the will—though admittedly Raz (1999: 10)
writes as if it did. Deciding to believe p could on a given occasion just consist in settling the question whether p in
the armative, with one thereby coming to believe p. This gloss does not say anything about the will; indeed, some
dictionary denitions of “decide” (cf. the Oxford English Dictionary) do not refer explicitly to the will but rather gloss
deciding as the settling or determining of something. Of course, deciding to believe does involve coming to believe
in an active rather than a passive way. But one could understand the active in a Reason-based way rather than by
reference to the will, as Raz himself does and as McHugh (2011) acknowledges (citing Hieronymi (2009)).
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involves none of the self-deception or Pascalian manoeuvring displayed by some examples
of indirect control and none of the irrationality displayed by far-fetched examples of direct
control. Finagling and irrationality seem avoidable in the cases of interest because it is already
plausible in them that more than one attitude would be epistemically rational. If so, there is
no need to manipulate the evidence to arrive at a dierent attitude in the way there would be
if one wanted, e.g., to believe something one takes to be disfavored by the evidence.
Accordingly, it is no accident that these writers base their view on putative cases where
epistemic rationality gives us options. It might initially have seemed peculiar to nd a broadly
psychological claim being defended on normative grounds.7 But normative grounds prove
crucial for securing the kind of control at stake, which is not a kind whose exercise requires
irrationality, self-deception, or Pascalian manoeuvring.
1.1 The Goals and the Plan
The aim of this paper is to undermine the Argument from Discretion by showing that epistemic
rationality does not give us the kind of discretion these authors take to support direct doxastic
control. I will argue that Discretion (premise (1)) is false, and that replacing it with the only
truths in the neighborhood would undermine premise (2). There are, I will observe, weaker
kinds of normative discretion that we plausibly have over our intellectual lives, but they would
not provide a foundation for the kind of direct doxastic control these authors are after.8
With these goals in view, here is the plan. After making some preliminary clarications
about the relationship between Discretion and other forms of epistemic permissivism in §1.3,
I will turn in §2 to undermine two arguments for Discretion and to oer an argument against
it. First, I will argue that Discretion is not supported by the apparent fact that we lack pos-
itive epistemic duties. Second, I will consider some examples of sucient but inconclusive
evidence that people have taken to support Discretion and argue that they provide no more
support than was provided by the case against positive epistemic duties. Indeed, I argue that
properly understood, these cases support the negation of Discretion. In §3, I give a further
argument against Discretion from the nature of agnosticism. The upshot of these sections is
that if agnosticism is an attitude in its own right rather than a mere form of non-belief, we
should reject Discretion. With that conclusion in mind, I give an error theory in §4 to explain
away the appeal of Discretion, noting how it is easily confused with a weaker thesis. I return to
the Argument from Discretion in §5 and argue that this weaker thesis—as well as some other
defensible theses—cannot play the role that Discretion was supposed to play.
1.2 Remarks about Discretion and Some Nearby Theses
Before proceeding, it is worth saying a bit about how the key premise in the Argument from
Discretion relates to some supercially similar claims discussed elsewhere in epistemology:
(Discretion) There are cases where it would be epistemically rational for a person either to believe
p or to be agnostic on p given total evidence E.
7Arguments of this form are not unprecedented in the relevant literature, however. From Williams (1973) onwards,
many arguments for involuntarism have appealed to substantive norms like the truth norm, the knowledge norm, or
evidentialist norms. See, e.g., Foley (1993: 16), Hieronymi (2006), and Velleman (2000). Some of these writers appeal
only directly to the idea that belief has a certain aim, which might appear to be a non-normative claim. But as
Wedgwood (2002), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005) and Gibbard (2006) argue, the idea that belief has an aim is
best understood in terms of a normative standard of correctness.
8Some opponents of direct voluntarism considered the kinds of cases invoked by proponents of the Argument
from Discretion and defended a conclusion like mine. Alston (1988: 264-6), Feldman (2000: 681), and Adler (2002: 62)
consider cases of good but inconclusive evidence and argue that when carefully examined, these cases don’t support
direct voluntarism. Proponents of the Argument from Discretion neglect these earlier diagnoses of their cases.
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Discretion is a thesis in the spirit of the “moderate permissivism” discussed by White (2005:
452-4).9 A minor dierence is that Discretion as stated contains no deontic vocabulary. This
is deliberate: the Argument from Discretion would otherwise seem question-begging to those
who think the applicability of deontic concepts to doxastic attitudes requires direct doxastic
control. But setting this dierence aside, Discretion is nearly identical to the moderate per-
missivist thesis that “there are cases in which a reasonable assessment of the evidence rules
out a belief that not-P, but does not dictate whether one should believe that P or suspend
judgment."10
Defenders of the Argument from Discretion actually embrace a more precise thesis that
is restricted to cases where the evidence is sucient (or “adequate”) but inconclusive.11 This
restriction is sensible. Either the evidence is sucient to rationalize belief or it isn’t. If it
isn’t, belief wouldn’t be epistemically rational. So, if belief and agnosticism are both rational
options, the evidence must be sucient. Moreover, either the evidence is conclusive or it
is inconclusive. While belief may be epistemically rational in both cases, it is less plausible
that agnosticism would be epistemically rational in the rst case. So, the best illustrations of
Discretion are precisely cases where the evidence is sucient but inconclusive.
Why focus on Discretion? Aren’t there other permissivist theses that one should consider
in this context? There are, of course, other permissivist theses that epistemologists have found
plausible in other contexts. But I think we can set most of these aside. For apart from the fact
that Discretion is the common starting point for defenders of the Argument from Discretion,
other plausible versions of epistemic permissivism couldn’t clearly play the same role.
Recall that the main context in which epistemic permissivism has been discussed is the
peer disagreement debate. For the purposes of this debate, the permissivist theses that matter
are interpersonal theses—i.e., ones that say that two individuals with the same total evidence
can rationally hold conicting doxastic attitudes. Interpersonal versions of permissivism are
plausible in the light of apparent reasonable disagreement among people with the same evi-
dence. And they are defensible for other reasons noted by Ballantyne and Coman (2011): if
we should combine evidence internalism with rationality externalism, it is plausible that we
should also accept an interpersonal version of permissivism.
I agree that interpersonal versions of permissivism are defensible. But as Kelly (2014: 304)
stresses, it is entirely possible to hold a view that is “permissive across individuals but that
is impermissive with respect to the range of options open to any particular individual”. And
I think it is plausible to hold interpersonal permissivism without intrapersonal permissivism:
the main arguments for interpersonal permissivism do not support intrapersonal permissivism.
The fact that two people with the same evidence can rationally hold dierent attitudes
implies nothing about whether more than one attitude is ever rationally available to a single
person given some xed body of evidence. Indeed, if the reason why two people reasonably
disagree on p is some externalist dierence between them—say, that one of them has com-
9Discretion might be traced back as far as Chisholm. In particular, Chisholm (1977) denes epistemic “acceptability”
in a way that makes room for Discretion, and embraces Discretion for epistemic acceptability:
All propositions that are beyond reasonable doubt will, of course, be acceptable, but there are many acceptable
propositions that are not beyond reasonable doubt. Any adequate theory of perception, for example, might
require us to say this: if I have that experience which might naturally be expressed by saying that I ‘seem to
see’ a certain state of aairs (e.g., ‘I seem to see a man standing there’), then the state of aairs that I thus seem
to perceive. . . is one that is, for me, ipso facto acceptable. It may be, however, that although the proposition is
thus acceptable, it is not beyond reasonable doubt: i.e., although withholding it is not more reasonable than
believing it, believing it cannot be said to be more reasonable than withholding it.
Similar claims appear in Chisholm (1982: 15). Interestingly, however, he here thinks that there is a dierence between
acceptability and reasonableness: “‘Acceptable’, then, expresses less praise than does ‘reasonable’”. And elsewhere he
denes reasonableness in a way that seems to preclude Discretion for it; e.g., in Chisholm (1988: 82) and Chisholm
(1966: 22), he stipulates that a belief is reasonable i believing is preferable to withholding.
10White (2005: 453)
11McHugh and Frankish use the term “sucient”, while Nickel uses the term “adequate”. Raz and Ginet use neither
term, but it seems clear that they have the same cases in mind.
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petences that the other lacks, but which are necessary for rationally believing p given the
evidence—this apparent fact clearly does not support an intrapersonal form of permissivism.
For at a given time, a single person cannot both have and lack the relevant externalist property.
Of course, over time, a person might acquire new discriminatory or inferential compe-
tences. And so it might well be possible for a person to rationally hold an attitude in response
to total evidence E at t that it wouldn’t have been rational for her to hold in response to E
before t. But if this were true, it wouldn’t mark a substantially dierent discovery than the
discovery of the truth of the interpersonal version of permissivism.
The interpersonal version of permissivism cannot play the role that Discretion plays in
the Argument from Discretion, since the Argument from Discretion is meant to establish an
intrapersonal claim. Even if two people could reasonably have dierent attitudes given the
same total evidence, that fact would not suggest that one of them would have the ability to
rationally decide to form a dierent attitude without some change in her total evidence (e.g.,
without acquiring the higher-order evidence provided by the fact of disagreement).
What about a diachronic intrapersonal permissivism that says that one and the same indi-
vidual can, at dierent times, rationally hold dierent attitudes in response to the same body
of evidence? It is implausible that this view alone could play the role that Discretion is sup-
posed to play. After all, this view might be true merely because (i) rationality depends not only
on evidence but on what one could competently believe on the basis of the evidence and (ii)
one can acquire new epistemic competences over time. If diachronic permissivism were true
merely for this reason, it wouldn’t follow that a subject could rationally decide to form another
attitude. The subject would have to change in externalist respects rst.
Mightn’t there be internalist reasons why one could rationally hold dierent attitudes given
the same evidence at dierent times? Perhaps a person could rationally come to a dierent view
because she thinks of a new explanation that seems better. As Douven (2009: 352-3) notes, it is
plausible that this person could at these dierent times be rational in holding dierent attitudes
in response to the same body of evidence. But if diachronic permissivism were true for this
reason, we still get no support for any interesting kind of doxastic control. To switch attitudes,
one must rst discover some alternative hypothesis that strikes one as better explaining the
evidence. Reecting on the possible explanations is perhaps something one can do at will. But
discovering an explanation that strikes one as better is not. Moreover, the control that such
reection would give one over one’s doxastic attitudes would be indirect.12
For these reasons, I think the version of permissivism that matters here is a synchronic
intrapersonal version. So I will henceforth focus on this more explicit version of Discretion:
(Discretion—Explicit) There are possible times t when it would be epistemically rational for one
either to believe p at t or to be agnostic about whether p at t given total evidence E at t.
Some dierent version of permissivism might be true. But I would deny that it could aid a
revised version of the Argument from Discretion. I will return to this thought in §4 and §5.
2 Two Cases for Discretion and a New Case against It
I turn now to consider two arguments for Discretion, which I will call the No Positive Epistemic
Duties Argument and the Inconclusiveness Argument. Seeing why these arguments fail will
bring out some lessons that can be used to directly undermine Discretion. Hence, in the nal
third of the section, I will present a direct argument against Discretion.
12I will return to this point again later, since it will play a role in my error theory. Precisely this point led Alston to
doubt that cases where the evidence supports a proposition inconclusively are cases in which we can exercise direct
doxastic control: “[H]ere too belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, from the way things seem
at the moment to the subject.” (1988: 266)
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2.1 The No Positive Epistemic Duties Argument
One might think that Discretion is a simple upshot of the apparent fact that there are no pos-
itive epistemic duties. Having some beliefs might be a practical necessity. But it is hard to
believe that there is anything that we are epistemically required to believe. Yet if we aren’t
epistemically required to believe any propositions, doesn’t it follow that we are epistemically
permitted to be agnostic on them?13 One might be tempted to say “Yes”.
For further support for this line, note that the evidence supports an innite number of
uninteresting conclusions whenever it supports any conclusion.14 Suppose, for example, I see
three birds eating from the bird feeder and know that the bird feeder does not have room
for more than ve birds. My evidence supports thinking that there is more than one bird,
more than two, at least three, fewer than six, fewer than seven, and so on ad innitum. My
evidence also supports an innite number of disjunctive propositions one of whose disjuncts
is the proposition that there are three birds on the feeder. I am not epistemically required to
believe these propositions. So, one might conclude, I am epistemically permitted to be agnostic
on them. Which propositions supported by my evidence are worth believing? Presumably the
ones that are interesting or useful to me—but those are (broadly) practical reasons.
Let’s put this argument more ocially:
The No Positive Epistemic Duties Argument
1. We are never epistemically required to believe anything.
2. If (1), then we are always epistemically permitted to be agnostic.
3. We are sometimes also epistemically permitted to believe.
4. So, sometimes belief and agnosticism are both epistemically permissible options.
Unfortunately, this argument overgeneralizes. Suppose I walk past a sign that has printed on
it the question: “Can horses speak English?” If I consider that question, agnosticism is not an
epistemically permissible response. To be agnostic would be irrationally undercondent. The
answer is obviously “No”. Of course, I am not required to disbelieve that horses can speak En-
glish. But that is because I am not required to give this question any attention. That fact does
not suggest that agnosticism is permitted. It suggests that no doxastic attitude, including ag-
nosticism, is required because ignoring the question is permitted. Lacking belief and disbelief
is not sucient for agnosticism, as this case suggests.
Accordingly, Discretion does not follow from the apparent fact that there is no epistemic
duty to take stances on propositions. The only thing that follows is the following:
(Permissible Oblivion) For innitely many propositions p, it is not epistemically irrational for
one not to believe p or ¬p even if one has sucient evidence to settle whether p.
Work on the nature of agnosticism conrms the importance of distinguishing Permissible
Oblivion and Discretion. Friedman (2013) and others argue that agnosticism is not merely
a form of non-belief, including a form of principled non-belief. It is an attitude in its own
right—a committed neutrality, to use Sturgeon (2010)’s phrase. It is true that it can be epistem-
ically permissible either to believe that p or to avoid or lack belief in p or ¬p for a reason. But
if agnosticism is not just principled non-belief, we do not hereby get a good reason to think
that it can be epistemically permissible either to believe or to be agnostic.
Does this distinction make a dierence for proponents of the Argument from Discretion?
Could they substitute Permissible Oblivion for Discretion? No. For although it is not dicult
to come to have a belief in a proposition that I am permitted to ignore (e.g., I can instead
13Way (2007) expresses this tempting inference nicely: “It is far from obvious why there cannot be evidential states
good enough to permit belief in p, without requiring belief in p, and thereby also permitting suspension of belief in p”
(228; italics mine).
14For a defense of the non-existence of positive epistemic duties along these lines, see Nelson (2010).
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consider this proposition), it does not follow that I hereby exercise any interesting form of
direct doxastic control. Once I consider the proposition that horses do not speak English,
belief arises automatically in response to the manifest truth of this proposition. While getting
myself to have this belief doesn’t involve any complicated manoeuvring, my inuence on what
I believe remains of an indirect, uncontroversial sort.
Interestingly, some friends of Discretion are sensitive to the dierence between non-belief
and agnosticism.15 But they haven’t appreciated the implications of the dierence for their
arguments. For while they do rely on more interesting cases for Discretion than the cases
dismissed in this subsection, these cases do not advance their goals any more than the cases
that motivate Permissible Oblivion. Or so I will argue.
2.2 The Inconclusiveness Argument
While the No Positive Epistemic Duties Argument may explain why some are tempted to em-
brace Discretion, this is not the main argument that defenders of direct doxastic control have
given. I will now consider their main argument at greater length.
This argument appeals to cases where propositions seem to be suciently (or “adequately”)
but not conclusively supported by our evidence. It can be put as follows:
The Inconclusiveness Argument
1. Sometimes people have sucient but not conclusive evidence for believing a proposition.
2. At these times, it would be epistemically rational for these subjects to believe the proposition
but it would also be epistemically rational for them to be agnostic instead.
3. If (2), Discretion is true.
4. So, Discretion is true.
My case against this argument will center on (2). I do not take (1) to be controversial if it is
read in a non-question-begging way. There is, it is worth noting, a way of dening the terms
in (1) that would make (2) follow trivially. One might use “conclusive evidence for p” to mean
evidence that renders disbelief in p and agnosticism in p epistemically irrational and “sucient
evidence for p” to mean evidence that merely renders disbelief epistemically irrational. If the
terms were dened in this way, then it is premise (1) that I would question. But neither I nor
the proponents of this argument understand the terms in this way.
How should these terms be understood? I assume that “sucient” evidence for p is evidence
sucient to justify belief in p. I also assume that “conclusive” evidence for p is evidence that
rules out p’s falsity. There are several things one could mean by saying that evidence E “rules
out” the falsity of a proposition p. One could mean that E entails p. Or, following Dretske
(1971), one could mean that if E were so, ¬p couldn’t be so, where the “couldn’t” picks out
something less than metaphysical impossibility. For present purposes, it won’t matter which
we choose. But the second way makes things more interesting and it is the way that some
fans of Discretion have in mind.16 I also take it that many people (including me) would agree
that (1) is true when the terms are understood in this way, since many people would deny that
justifying evidence must be infallible. So (1) is not the more controversial premise.
With that clarication in mind, let’s consider the case for premise (2). I will focus on the
way Nickel defends (2) because it is representative and it is the most detailed of the defenses
that have been given. There are many examples that dierent defenders of this argument have
given to support (2). I lack space to consider all of them, but the points that I will make about
Nickel’s cases generalize to other cases.
Here is a putative example of sucient but inconclusive evidence from Nickel (2010: 313):
15McHugh (2013) approvingly cites Friedman when explaining how he is understanding suspension of judgment.
16McHugh and Nickel both understand “conclusive evidence” in this way. Other fans of Discretion are less clear on
what “conclusive evidence” is meant to mean.
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(big lizard testimony) “My roommate, a serious and sensible person, announces to me that
he has just been outside and seen a three-foot lizard in the driveway. I have never seen such a
large lizard in the area before, and I have some reason to doubt whether any lizards of that size
live naturally in the area.”
How might this case support Discretion? There are two forms of support that one might take
big lizard testimony to lend to Discretion. Firstly, one might claim that given the evidence, it
would be epistemically rational to believe that there was a big lizard in the driveway (because
one’s friend is serious, reliable, sensible. . . ), but also epistemically rational to be agnostic (be-
cause that would be an oddly big lizard). If one’s evidence in big lizard testimony is indeed
sucient, that yields discretion with respect to the following non-normative proposition:
(i) There is a big lizard outside.
Secondly, one might also claim that with respect to the normative proposition,
(ii) I have sucient evidence to think that there is a big lizard outside,
it would be epistemically permissible to believe but also permissible to be agnostic.
Nickel seems to think that we have both forms of discretion in cases like big lizard testi-
mony. It is tempting, I agree, to think that we do. But it is worth probing a bit deeper into why
it seems that one could rationally hold either attitude with respect to (i) in this case. When we
see why, we will discover some facts that undermine the Inconclusiveness Argument.
Note that Nickel at several points implies that what gives one seeming discretion with
respect to (i)-type propositions is that one has seeming discretion with respect to (ii)-type
propositions. Nickel writes of big lizard testimony: “Here again, I think, is a case in which I
am in a position to take my roommate’s testimony as providing adequate reason to believe that
there was a three-foot lizard in the driveway, or to suspend belief and demand more evidence.
If I do adopt the belief that there was such a lizard, it will, I propose, be voluntarily so.”17 The
thought is even more vivid when Nickel discusses another case in support of (2):
(train sounds) “I have lived for three years in an area where I have never heard the sound of a
train, although I have observed some seemingly unused train tracks. I do not know whether the
train tracks have fallen into disrepair. One morning, as I am working, I hear the sound of a train
whistle, and I feel the distinctive vibration of a locomotive.”18
Nickel says of train sounds:
This, I propose, is a situation in which I am in a position voluntarily to adopt the belief that there
is a locomotive nearby. I accomplish this by taking the reasons I have to support that belief. But I
have more than one reasonable option. I may take the sound of the locomotive to provide adequate
reason to believe that there is a locomotive, or I may take it not to provide adequate reason for that
belief.19
Similar thoughts apply naturally to the rst case. It is easiest to imagine you being agnostic
because you worry that mere testimony is not sucient evidence for (i).
This feature of Nickel’s defense uncovers a problem for the Inconcusiveness Argument that
will lead me to an argument against Discretion in §2.3. According to proponents of Discretion,
it is permissible for you to be agnostic even when your evidence is sucient, provided that it
is also not conclusive. But the fact that it is most natural to regard you as becoming agnostic
by getting yourself to take the evidence to be insucient suggests that it is not easy to regard
oneself as having discretion in these kinds of cases. If it were clear that we had discretion in
17Nickel (2010: 314).
18Verbatim from Nickel (2010: 313–314).
19Nickel (2010: 314); italics mine.
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these kinds of cases, we would not have to regard the testimony as providing insuciently
strong evidence for (ii) in order to be agnostic. We should be able to regard it as sucient
but remain agnostic. But we cannot do so while remaining fully rational. It is akratic and
undercondent to think: “The evidence is not merely good but sucient to justify belief. Still,
I am agnostic.” While undercondence is perhaps a less serious mistake than overcondence, it
is still a mistake. Indeed, in this case, the undercondence is an example of epistemic akrasia.20
Of course, you can regard the testimony as providing good reason for thinking that (i) is
true while rationally being agnostic on (i). Indeed, you can regard the testimony as providing
very good reason for thinking that (i) is true while being rationally agnostic on (i). But good
reasons—even very good reasons—are not the same as sucient reasons. So we must ask: can
you with full condence regard the testimony as good enough to justify belief while rationally
being agnostic? No. I suspect the only reason why it might be hard to regard our agent as
undercondent is that it is hard to see how someone could sincerely think with full condence
that the relevant testimony is sucient to justify belief in (i).
One might worry that these points only show that we lack more than one rational option in
reective cases where we believe that our evidence is sucient.21 There are unreective cases
where we do not have any beliefs about the quality of our evidence. What about those cases?
Couldn’t we still have Discretion in them for all I have said?
While I agree that it is non-trivial to draw a conclusion about the status of Discretion in
unreective cases on the basis of the reective cases I have been considering, I will show that
we can properly draw this conclusion in the next section on the basis of facts about the re-
lationship between akrasia and reasons. For the moment, however, our observations should
make us worried about the stated case for (2) and unconvinced by examples like big lizard
testimony. Indeed, the versions of these cases in which agnosticism most clearly seems ratio-
nal are precisely reective cases in which one has doubts about the suciency of the evidence.
So the argument for (2) is still undermined by my observations.
There is another reason to doubt that cases like big lizard testimony support (2). Think
about what normally happens when one rationally takes the evidence to be insucient. One
considers the evidence and gains some higher-order evidence: it strikes one as insuciently
clear that the evidence is strong enough, or it strikes one as clear that the evidence is strong
enough. One then responds with a doxastic attitude. Notice that in these cases, one’s stock
of total evidence appears to increase. It now includes some higher-order evidence concerning
the quality of the evidence for the relevant (i)-type proposition.
If this higher-order evidence is part of the total evidence, we should be doubtful for another
reason that cases like big lizard testimony support premise (2). Premise (2) says that if one
has sucient evidence for p, it can be permissible either to believe or to be agnostic on p. The
suciency of a given piece of evidence is to be assessed relative to the total evidence. If the
total evidence is dierent in the case in which one can rationally believe and the case in which
one can rationally be agnostic, we get no obvious support for premise (2). We already knew
that it can be rational to believe p given total evidence E and rational to be agnostic given
slightly changed total evidence E*. If the total evidence is not the same when it is rational for
one to believe and when it is rational for one to be agnostic, we should be suspicious.
Now, there are dierent views about the impact that higher-order evidence can have on
what is epistemically rational at the rst order. Some theorists—level splitters, to use Horowitz
(forthcoming)’s term—think that it has no impact on what is rationally permissible at the rst-
order. Level splitters will, however, typically agree that it has some eect on what is excusable
or blameless at the rst-order.22 Others—level bridgers—think that higher-order evidence can
20By “akrasia” I do not mean weakness of will; like Holton (2009), I would distinguish the two. I rather mean acting
or forming attitudes in a way that would amount to a failure to correctly respond to reasons if one’s beliefs about the
reasons in play were true. So dened, claiming that there is such a thing as epistemic akrasia doesn’t presuppose that
we have any kind of control over our attitudes.
21Credit goes to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to talk more explicitly about this objection.
22Some prominent level splitters include Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014), Weatherson (MS), and Williamson (2011). All
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have an impact on what is epistemically rational at the rst order.23 But both views undermine
the case for premise (2).
Level bridgers will think that if one acquires the higher-order evidence that one’s rst-
order evidence for p appears insucient, that higher-order evidence undercuts the support for
p. So, on a level-bridging view, it is clear that we get no case for Discretion if what makes
agnosticism become rational is the appearance that one’s evidence is insucient. In that case,
it will not be rational for one to believe the rst-order proposition. It was rational moments
before. But one’s total evidence was dierent.
Level splitters, by contrast, will think that if believing p was rationally permissible before
the evidence appeared insucient, believing p is still rationally permissible afterwards. But
given the appearance, one couldn’t be blamed for taking one’s evidence to be insucient, and
so couldn’t be blamed for being agnostic on that basis. Level-splitting views also do not aid the
case for premise (2). While these views agree that both believing p and being agnostic about
whether p could each merit some positive appraisal, they will deny that these attitudes could at
one time merit the same appraisal. Believing p is rationally permissible, while being agnostic
is excusable, blameless, or whatever.
So, we have a second reason for doubting that cases like big lizard testimony supports
Discretion. It will often be by reecting on the rst-order evidence and gaining some higher-
order evidence that one gures out whether to believe or to be agnostic. On a level-bridging
view, what happens in the case in which one is agnostic is that one’s total evidence goes from
suciently supporting to not suciently supporting the (i)-type proposition. That scenario
provides no support for Discretion. On a level-splitting view, what happens when one pro-
ceeds to be agnostic is that the evidence remains the same, but one’s decision to be agnostic
is excusable given the status that the evidence appears to have. It does not follow that agnos-
ticism is rationally permitted. The motivations for splitting levels require us not to draw that
conclusion. Without that conclusion, we get no support for Discretion.
I have now assessed the case for premise (2) with respect to (i)-type propositions. But
remember: cases like big lizard testimony were supposed to provide two avenues of support
for premise (2). They were supposed to make it plausible that we not only have discretion with
respect to (i)-type propositions, but also with respect to (ii)-type propositions.
I have not explicitly assessed whether we have discretion with respect to (ii)-type propo-
sitions. Still, it is easy to see why we should doubt that we have discretion with respect to
(ii)-type propositions. We have discretion here only if it can be true that
(a) We have sucient reason for thinking that (ii) is true,
while it is true that
(b) We are rationally permitted to be agnostic on (ii).
But again, if it is clear that (a) is the case, it would be undercondent to remain agnostic on
(ii). If we had discretion in these cases, we wouldn’t expect that. On the other hand, if it is
not clear to one that (a) is the case, one could rationally be agnostic about (ii). On what basis
would one be agnostic? Presumably on the basis of the fact that it is not suciently clear that
(a) is so. But now our earlier points apply. The fact that (a) is not suciently clear will be a
piece of higher-order evidence. Our earlier points about higher-order evidence apply again.
We can run the dilemma we ran before to show that we get no support for premise (2).
three are sympathetic to the idea that there is a distinction between justication and some weaker status, though they
have dierent words for that status—“reasonable” in Lasonen-Aarnio’s case, “praiseworthy” in Weatherson’s case (cf.
Weatherson (2008)), and “excusable” in Williamson’s case (cf. Williamson (2007) and (2013)).
23See Christensen (2010), Elga (2007), Horowitz (forthcoming) and Kelly (2010).
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2.3 An Argument against Discretion from Undercondence
I conclude that cases like big lizard testimony provide insucient support for premise (2).
Indeed, key observations about these cases actually support an argument against Discretion.
Reection on these cases brought out the following datum:
(Undercondence Datum) It is less than fully rational to believe at t that the evidence for p is
sucient but to remain agnostic on p at t. This amounts to akratic undercondence.
Given this datum, it is easy to argue directly against this more precise version of Discretion:
(Discretion for Sucient but Inconclusive Cases (DSIC)) When a person’s evidence for p at
t is sucient but not conclusive, it would be epistemically rational for this person to believe p at
t but also epistemically rational for her to be agnostic on p at t instead.
How does the argument go?
The Undercondence Datum tells us that a certain combination of states is less than fully
rational: believing that the evidence for p is sucient and being agnostic. Accordingly, there
is plausibly a wide-scope rational requirement banning this combination of attitudes:
(REQ) Rationality requires that: if one believes the evidence for p is sucient at t, one is not
agnostic about p at t.
REQ is a requirement that belongs to the family of coherence requirements that Broome (2013)
calls “enkratic” requirements. These are requirements that ban akratic combinations of atti-
tudes. Related plausible enkratic requirements include:
(REQ-1) Rationality requires that: if you believe you have sucient evidence that p at t, you don’t
disbelieve that p at t.
(REQ-2) Rationality requires that: if you believe that there is sucient evidence that p at t and
you believe that if p then q at t, you don’t disbelieve that q at t.24
Enkratic requirements are not free-oating requirements. To see why, remember that the point
of these requirements is to ban cases of akrasia. What are cases of akrasia? By a standard def-
inition, they are cases in which it is true that if
one’s beliefs about the reasons in play were true,
it would be true that
one would be doing something that these reasons require one not to do.
Conditionals of this sort are true partly in virtue of background principles about reasons. I will
illustrate this point rst with a non-epistemic case of akrasia. The case to be considered is one
where one pursues a sucient means M for an end E that one takes oneself to have conclusive
reason not to pursue. Let’s consider why it is true that if
one’s belief that one has conclusive reason not to pursue end E were true
24Admittedly, these requirements are inconsistent with an extreme synchronic intrapersonal permissivism. But I
have serious doubts about whether anyone would accept such a view. An interpersonal extreme permissivism might be
plausible, and so might a diachronic intrapersonal extreme permissivism. Moreover, as Douven (2009) notes, it might
be plausible to hold the counterfactual intrapersonal extreme permissivist claim that one could have had the same
evidence at t and been rational in holding an opposite attitude on p at t to the one that one now rationally holds at t
had one’s priors been dierent. But none of these claims conicts with REQ-1 or REQ-2.
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it would be true that
one would be doing something one shouldn’t do in pursuing means M.
This conditional is true partly because if one has conclusive reason not to pursue some end
E, one also has conclusive reason not to pursue a sucient means M for E. This gives us our
background principle about reasons:
(P-INT) If there is conclusive reason not to pursue some end E, there is also conclusive reason not
to pursue a sucient means M for E.
And this principle underwrites the following enkratic requirement:
(REQ-INT) Rationality requires that: if one believes there is conclusive reason not to pursue some
end E, one does not pursue a sucient means M for E.
By parity of reasoning, we can see that to REQ-1 and REQ-2 there correspond the following
principles about epistemic reasons:
(P1) If there is sucient epistemic reason for one to believe that p at t, then there is not sucient
epistemic reason for one to disbelieve that p at t.
(P2) If there is sucient epistemic reason for one to believe that p at t and that p entails q at t,
then there is not sucient epistemic reason to disbelieve q at t.
Any enkratic requirement will be accompanied by principles like P1 and P2. These principles
are what make it true that if one’s beliefs about the reasons were true, one would doing some-
thing that these reasons require one not to do. The cases that enkratic requirements like REQ-1
and REQ-2 ban wouldn’t even be cases of akrasia if principles like P1 and P2 weren’t true.
Notice now that these principles double as norms that you might violate—e.g., you might
violate P1 when you have sucient evidence that p and you disbelieve p. Notice moreover
that when you violate REQ-1, that is because you would be violating P1 if your relevant beliefs
were true, and that when you violate REQ-2, that is because you would be violating P2 if your
relevant beliefs were true. We can generalize: whenever you violate an enkratic requirement,
you are such that if your relevant beliefs were true, you would be violating a norm that, like
P1 and P2, doubles as a principle about reasons.
If that is right, however, we can consider REQ and ask: what is the norm that you would
be violating if your relevant beliefs were true? Symmetry suggests that it is this norm:
(P) If one’s evidence for p is sucient at t, one lacks sucient epistemic reason to be agnostic on
p at t.
But this norm is inconsistent with DSIC. So we should reject DSIC. To put this argument more
ocially:
The Undercondence Argument
1. The Undercondence Datum is a datum.
2. If (1), REQ is a true enkratic requirement.
3. If REQ is a true enkratic requirement, (P) is a true norm.
4. If (P) is a true norm, DSIC is false.
5. So, DSIC is false.
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Since I’ve already defended the premises, we should reject DSIC.
Of course, DSIC is not identical to Discretion. But we should still reject Discretion if we
reject DSIC. This is because cases of sucient but inconclusive evidence just are the only cases
where Discretion seems plausible. Again, either the evidence is sucient to rationalize belief
or it isn’t. If it isn’t, belief isn’t a rational option, and so at most one of belief and agnosticism is
a rational option. Moreover, either the evidence is conclusive or it isn’t. If it is, agnosticism isn’t
plausibly a rational option, and so at most one of belief and agnosticism is a rational option.
The only cases left to consider are cases where the evidence is sucient but not conclusive.
We can now see the answer to the lingering worry from the last subsection. There I noted
that if you believe that your evidence is sucient, it would be undercondent to be agnostic.
From this it followed that we lack Discretion in cases where we believe that our evidence is
sucient. But one might have worried that nothing follows about unreective cases in which
we don’t have beliefs about the quality of our evidence. This worry is answered by the fact
that enkratic requirements are underwritten by principles about reasons that double as further
norms. This fact ensures that if the Undercondence Datum is a datum, DSIC is false.
3 The Nature of Agnosticism and the Falsity of Discretion
I have undermined two arguments for Discretion and oered one argument against it. I am
now going to show how a plausible view about agnosticism motivates the rejection of Discre-
tion. As I will note at the end of this section, I think this view about agnosticism explains the
Undercondence Datum and, by explaining it, receives further support. But I think this view
is independently defensible, as the rest of this section will illustrate.
I am not going to give an analysis of agnosticism. Rather, I am going to highlight an impor-
tant necessary condition on agnosticism that should constrain our nal analysis of agnosticism
if it is analysable; even if it is unanalysable, there can still be illuminating necessary conditions
on it. And I will argue that if this necessary condition holds, we should deny that it is ever
epistemically rational to be agnostic on p when the evidence for p is sucient. Since cases of
sucient but inconclusive evidence are the only plausible witnesses for Discretion (given the
distinction between non-belief and agnosticism), we should also reject Discretion.
What is the necessary condition that I have in mind? We can see it by reecting on a
point that Friedman (2013) makes about agnosticism. Friedman maintains—convincingly, I
think—that considering a question and holding no attitude vis-a-vis that question is insu-
cient for being agnostic on the question. To support this thought, she asks us to consider two
subjects, A and B:
A is prompted to consider whether my mother was a juror for a bank robbery trial in late 1970
(p), quickly recognizes that she has no relevant evidence and has absolutely no idea and suspends
judgment about my mother’s jury duties. B knows a bit about me and so starts to think about my
mother’s jury duties. But before he gets very far, the plumber calls over to x his leaky shower,
and he drops the question about my other completely. At 15:07 (while he’s explaining the problem
to the plumber), B has stopped considering p and is in a state of non-belief with respect to p, but
B is not agnostic about p at 15:07; he isn’t suspending judgment about my mother’s jury duties. . . .
A might be agnostic about p, but B is not.25
Friedman says of B that “he never seems to get to the bit where he actually suspends” and that
“[d]eliberation cuts out before he does whatever he would need to do to move into a state of
suspended judgment”. I agree. Now here is a question:
(Q) What features is B’s case missing that a case of agnosticism would display?
25Friedman (2012: 170).
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I do not want to try to give a complete answer to (Q). But I will give a partial answer, and it
will be the central premise in this section’s argument against Discretion.
Part of my partial answer to (Q) is that B is not resistant to believing p and also not resistant
to disbelieving p. But among other things, an agnostic about p would conclude inquiry by being
resistant to believing p and being resistant to disbelieving p. Resistance to belief has already
been proposed as a necessary condition for agnosticism. For example, Bergmann (2005: 421)
suggests that “withholding p involves resistance. . . to believing p and to disbelieving p”. I take
it that we have the same thing in mind. I don’t have an analysis to give of resistance to belief
and neither does Bergmann. But I can say that to be resistant to believing p is the opposite of
being inclined to believe p—that is, a resistance to believe stands to an inclination to believe as
repulsion stands to attraction. So understood, it is no less clear than the notion of an inclination
to believe, which gures prominently in analyses of intuitive and perceptual seemings.
Friedman denies that resistance provides a complete answer to (Q). I agree. Here is one
example that will suggest my fuller necessary condition. Imagine that you are interested in
answering a question Z and you take yourself to have all the evidence you need to answer Z.
But it is getting late and you nd it hard to focus on the evidence. On this basis, you might
resist trying to answer Z, and hence resist believing and disbelieving any answers to Z because
you feel you cannot focus well enough on the evidence. You will return to Z in the morning.
Are you agnostic? My inclination is to say that if B was not agnostic in Friedman’s case above,
neither are you in this case. You have not settled on any view about the matter, agnosticism
included. But as Friedman claims, agnosticism is a settled attitude.
What else would be required for agnosticism? Presumably a settled resistance to belief
and to disbelief is also required. How should settled resistance be understood? Reecting on
agnosticism in the religious case is helpful. A religious agnostic does not relate to the question
of God’s existence in the way that you related to the various answers to your question in the
scenario I imagined. Why not? Well, the most familiar kind of religious agnostic will think
that his current evidence just doesn’t provide him with what he needs to answer this question.
Of course, agnostics disagree about whether they could ever acquire evidence that would give
them what they need to answer this question. Some agnostics think the question couldn’t ever
be settled by evidence. But not all agnostics are like this: some simply deny that their current
evidence provides them with what they need to answer this question. Some agnostics even
insist that true agnosticism necessarily involves leaving it open that we could later discover
strong enough epistemic reason to believe or disbelieve.26
We can set aside whether that last idea is right. The key point is that the agnostic’s state of
mind is a response to the quality of their evidence.27 It is in this way that agnostics dier from
you in the earlier example. You think your evidence provides you with the resources you need
to answer your question. Your resistance owes merely to the fact that you are too tired to use
those resources well. The agnostic’s resistance owes to the fact that he takes his evidence not
to provide the resources he needs. He may open to changing his mind given new evidence. But
given his current evidence, he is committed to resisting belief and disbelief. It is in that way
that his resistance is settled—not settled forever, but settled relative to his present evidence.
With those clarications in mind, here is the necessary condition on agnosticism on which
my argument will be relying:
(NEC) S is agnostic on whether p at t only if S is at t settled on resistance to believing p and to
disbelieving p on S’s total evidence E at t.
Although I agree with Friedman that this isn’t a sucient condition for agnosticism, nothing
she has said disqualies it as a necessary condition. For the reasons just rehearsed, I think it
is a plausible necessary condition on agnosticism.
26An entertaining example is Jorge Luis Borges, who apparently said: “Being an agnostic means that all things are
possible, even god, even the Holy Trinity”; see Shenker (1971).
27What about swamp-agnostics? Such agnostics could still be dispositionally responsive to the quality of their
evidence in the relevant way, even if—lacking any psychological history—they hadn’t ever reected on their evidence.
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Now I can give my argument. I take it that if NEC is plausible, we should also accept:
(R) It is epistemically rational for S to be agnostic on p at t only if it is epistemically rational for S
at t to be settled on resistance to believing p and to disbelieving p on S’s total evidence E at t.
I don’t see how (R) could be denied if we accept NEC. If it is not epistemically rational to be
resistant to believing p and disbelieving p on evidence E, then, assuming NEC, it is hard to see
how it could be epistemically rational for S to be agnostic on p.
But I will now argue that if (R) is true, we should reject the restricted version of Discretion
mentioned in the last section:
(DSIC) When a person’s evidence for p at t is sucient but not conclusive, it would be rational
for this person to believe p at t but also rational for her to be agnostic on p at t instead.
The argument turns on the thought that in any case where the evidence for p is sucient,
it couldn’t be epistemically rational for S to settle in a state of resistance to believing p and
to disbelieving p on her evidence. Given this thought and (R), it follows that it would not be
epistemically rational for S to be agnostic in such a case. So, given (R), we should reject DSIC.
Why think that settled resistance to believing p on the evidence wouldn’t be epistemically
rational when the evidence for p is sucient? I think this verdict is immediately compelling
when it is properly understood. Obviously, if S is just temporarily resisting belief because she
doesn’t have a clear view of the evidence (say, because S is tired), then S needn’t be doing
anything epistemically irrational. But as we saw earlier, that kind of temporary resistance
isn’t sucient for agnosticism. Agnosticism consists in settled resistance to belief on the evi-
dence—a committed neutrality relative to one’s evidence. While there might be practical rea-
sons for someone to have a settled resistance to believing p even given sucient evidence for
p, settled resistance given such evidence would not plausibly be epistemically rational.
There are other ways to misunderstand this verdict that obscure its plausibility. One might
think: “But no one is epistemically required to believe anything on the basis of sucient ev-
idence.” But again, this thought confuses agnosticism with non-belief. There is perhaps no
epistemic requirement to consider any question. From that claim, it may plausibly follow that
we are not epistemically required to believe anything. But it doesn’t follow that when one is
trying to settle on a stance with respect to some question, it is epistemically rational to settle
on resistance to believing p given one’s evidence if one’s evidence for p is sucient. Once the
distinction is drawn, that further claim just seems false.
I have encountered one rationale for resisting my verdict that persists even when all the
relevant distinctions are drawn. A resistor might say: “Mightn’t it be epistemically rational for
someone to believe that the evidence for p is insucient even when it is sucient? Indeed,
isn’t this kind of mistake easy to imagine if the evidence is sucient but not conclusive? Yet if
it could be epistemically rational for someone to falsely believe that the evidence is insucient,
couldn’t it then be rational to settle on resistance even when the evidence is sucient?”
This objection faces a dilemma that resembles one I pressed in the last section. To see it,
note that a question in the background is whether the following thesis is true:
(T) It is possible to rationally believe that one’s evidence for p is insucient when it is sucient.
One might reject (T). There is an important objection it. Evidence for p is sucient only when
undefeated. But if it were rational to believe that the evidence for p is insucient, that fact
may amount to an undercutting defeater. If so, (T) is false. This is what the level bridger says.
Not everyone will be convinced that such higher-order defeat is possible. A level splitter
might say that the suciency of the evidence just needn’t be transparent in the way that (T)
suggests. But level splitters tend to be status splitters, and arguably must be for their view to
be plausible. They will say that when you have a false rational belief about the quality of the
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evidence, you will merely be blameless for heeding that belief. They will distinguish blameless-
ness from what I’ve been calling “rationality” (which they might prefer to call “justication”).
With these two views in view, we can see why the objection fails. The objection was that
if (T) is true, it would be rational for you to be agnostic even when the evidence is sucient.
But either level bridging or level splitting is the right view about the impact of rational beliefs
about the quality of one’s evidence. If level bridging is right, (T) is false. If level splitting is
right, the inference on which the objection relies fails. The level splitter will elsewhere say
that attitudes based on false but rational beliefs about the evidence are merely blameless, not
permissible. Consistency requires saying the same thing about this case. But then this isn’t a
case in which agnosticism is rationally permissible. So even if (T) is true, it doesn’t follow that
agnosticism is rationally permissible, as the objector insisted.
Wouldn’t some level splitters want to equate rationality and blamelessness, and distinguish
both from justication or permissibility? Yes. But the important thing to note is that for the
level splitter, the case described by (T) is not a case in which there is some single normative
status—whether it be justication, permissibility, rationality, or whatever—that the believer
and the agnostic could instantiate given the evidence at t. Rather, it is belief that would be
permissible (or justied, or rational) and agnosticism that would be blameless. Dierent level
splitters will use dierent normative vocabulary, and some of them will use the term “rational”
where I have been using “blameless”. But that doesn’t matter: for DSIC to be true, it would have
to be possible for either belief or agnosticism to instantiate the same normative status given
the evidence. Otherwise the evidence doesn’t give us real discretion. But according to the
consistent level splitter, it will not be possible for belief and agnosticism to both be candidates
for the same normative status given the evidence.
Having undermined this objection, I think it is safe to conclude that DSIC is false. But as
I argued in the last section, DSIC describes the only plausible scenario in which Discretion
could be true. So, we should reject Discretion.
Let’s take stock. What I’ve done in this section is presented the following argument:
The Argument from the Nature of Agnosticism
1. Being agnostic about whether p necessarily involves a settled resistance to believing p and
disbelieving p on one’s evidence.
2. If (1), then it is epistemically rational to be agnostic about whether p only if it is epistemically
rational to have a settled resistance to believing p and disbelieving p on one’s evidence.
3. But it is epistemically rational to have a settled resistance to believing p and disbelieving p on
one’s evidence only if one’s evidence for p is insucient.
4. So, it is epistemically rational to be agnostic about whether p only if one’s evidence for p is
insucient.
I then said that if (4) is true, Discretion is false, and concluded that Discretion is false.
Premise (1) I took to follow from reection on some cases from Friedman (2013). I agreed
with Friedman that this necessary condition isn’t a sucient condition for agnosticism. But I
only need the necessary condition and nothing she has said undermines it. Of course, neces-
sary conditions can fail to be constitutive, so it might be misleading to call this an argument
from the “nature” of agnosticism. As it happens, I do think resistance is partly constitutive of
agnosticism, but I won’t defend that belief here. Nor does this issue matter for the status of
(2): even if resistance isn’t constitutive of agnosticism but is merely causally necessary for it, it
remains plausible that agnosticism will only be epistemically rational if the resistance to belief
in which it is based (causally) is itself epistemically rational.
I claimed that (3) is immediately plausible once we distinguish it from other claims. It is
not epistemically irrational to resist forming any attitude until one has a clear view of the
evidence. We are entitled to get a clear view of the evidence before we take a stand. It is
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epistemically virtuous for a person to take no stand until she has a clear view of the evidence.
But we can’t forget that agnosticism is itself a stand in the minimal sense that it involves settled
resistance. And it is not plausible that settled resistance to believing p on one’s evidence could
be epistemically rational if one’s evidence for believing p is indeed sucient. While one might
insist that it could be epistemically rational if one has a false rational belief to the eect that
the evidence is insucient, I showed that this objection faces a crippling dilemma.
My response to this objection could be combined with points from the last section. It
should be surprising that the only case in which it seems plausibly epistemically rational to
settle on resistance to belief on one’s evidence is a case in which one believes that the evidence
is insucient. For as we saw in the last section, it is irrational to settle on resistance to belief
given some evidence if we take it to sucient. Insofar as we have a stance on the suciency
of the evidence, why must that stance be negative for settled resistance to seem rational?
Plausibly, because we don’t after all have discretion in these cases. Combined with the points
from the last section, reection on the objection to (3) strengthens the case against Discretion.
The arguments from this section and the last cohere in a further way. (1) helps to explain the
Undercondence Datum and receives further support from it. There is something manifestly
defective about thinking: “My evidence for P is sucient, and yet I settle on resistance to belief
in p (and disbelief in p too) on my evidence.” Plausibly, then, the more fundamental reason why
the Undercondence Datum is true is that agnosticism necessarily involves settled resistance
to belief on one’s evidence. So (1) and the Undercondence Datum are mutually supporting. Of
course, if the only argument for (1) were that it explained the Undercondence Datum, then
the argument in this section wouldn’t add new support for my rejection of Discretion. But
since (1) is independently defensible, this argument adds support.
Perhaps one will reply to my rejection of Discretion by saying: “I agree that Discretion
fails if it is a thesis about “agnosticism” in your sense. But this just shows that you have
misunderstood the spirit of the view. It is not a thesis about agnosticism in your sense, but
rather about some species of non-belief.” But I think that this reply gets things backwards. This
is for a reason foreshadowed in §1 that I will reinforce in the following two sections: namely,
that the other thesis to which the objector alludes cannot do the work that people wanted
Discretion to do. Indeed, the error theory I will use to diagnose the attraction of Discretion is
that it is easily confused with the objector’s other thesis.
4 An Error Theory
The plausibility of Discretion is, I claim, illusory. What generates the illusion?
Part of what generates it is the easiness of confusing agnosticism with non-belief of various
kinds. I think the illusion is more complex than this, however. After all, it is consistent with
the non-existence of positive epistemic duties that we do have a conditional epistemic duty
to hold whatever attitude on a question is supported by the evidence if we are considering
that question with the hope of answering it. Yet that claim too is falsied by points about
some of Friedman’s examples. In her example involving A and B discussed in the last section,
B was hoping to answer the question and yet held no attitude. It is implausible that B was
doing anything even slightly epistemically irrational in taking no stance on the question. So it
cannot be that we are even conditionally required to hold an attitude when we are considering a
question in the hope of settling it. We are not even doing anything epistemically problematic if
we resist belief and disbelief in the midst of considering a question with the hope of answering
it on the basis of our evidence.
These observations bring out a more complete way of explaining the illusion. I think we
confuse Discretion with the following claim:
(Prerogative of Reective Silence (PRS)) Even if belief in p would be epistemically rational
given the evidence, it would not be epistemically irrational to hold no attitude on whether p even
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when considering the question whether p in the hope of settling it.
Discretion is easily confused with PRS. But PRS could be true even if Discretion is false.
Agnosticism is an attitude. PRS does not entail that agnosticism would not be epistemically
irrational when considering the question whether p in the hope of answering it. Indeed, since
agnosticism is a settled attitude held with respect to p given one’s evidence, it is plausible that it
would be incoherent to be agnostic about whether p while considering the question of whether
p in the hope of answering it on the basis of one’s evidence. If you are agnostic about whether
p, you are settled on resisting belief and disbelief in p given your current evidence. You might,
of course, be open to the possibility of believing or disbelieving p given new evidence. But
given your current evidence, you have settled on committed neutrality.
PRS and Discretion come apart in another way that should undermine attraction to Dis-
cretion. Notice that PRS is consistent with acceptably taking no attitude with respect to the
question of whether p amidst considering whether p even when your evidence for p is conclusive.
We have conclusive epistemic reasons to accept conclusions that take a moment to process.
There are, for example, unobvious facts about our conscious mental lives that we can nonethe-
less know, and indeed know that we know. I can have conclusive evidence for thinking that I
am suering a visual appearance of a ten-speckled hen. Yet when presented with the question
of whether I am suering a visual appearance of a ten-speckled hen, it may take me a moment
to process the evidence. But when I hold no attitude during that interval, I am not agnostic. I
know I can settle the question given my evidence. Nor is it tempting to think I could rationally
be agnostic here. Given my total evidence, it would be undercondent to be agnostic.
The fact that PRS is just as plausible in cases of conclusive evidence should undermine our
condence in Discretion. Of course, you might think instead that the fact that PRS is just as
plausible in these cases makes it unpromising to use PRS to explain away our attraction to
Discretion. But that is not right. For until we think about how PRS and Discretion could come
apart, it is extremely tempting to infer Discretion from PRS.
So our error theory is attractive. And it yields a unied diagnosis of where the arguments
for Discretion led us astray. The arguments discussed in §2 fail for the same reason. Both rest
on a failure to distinguish between the claim that
when one has sucient evidence for p, it would not be epistemically irrational to hold no attitude
on whether p even when considering the question whether p in the hope of settling it
and the claim that
when one has sucient evidence for p, it would not be epistemically irrational to be agnostic on
whether p
These claims are easy to confuse. But they come apart both when the evidence is conclusive
and when the evidence is sucient but not conclusive. In the former case, agnosticism is
clearly epistemically irrational. In the latter case, agnosticism is a premature stance that is at
least not fully epistemically rational (though it is less irrational than in the former case).
I don’t claim to have given an exhaustive explanation of our misguided attraction to Discre-
tion. Misguidedness is often overdetermined. There are other reasons why Discretion might
be tempting. I will mention two other reasons that seem important.
One reason is that we think modesty is a virtue, and so we may be less inclined to criticize
undercondence than overcondence. Hence, it may strike us as wrong to describe someone
who is agnostic despite having sucient evidence as falling short of any ideal.
I agree that modesty is a virtue and perhaps a virtue that we can manifest by being under-
condent. And I agree that it can feel wrong to criticize people in all the cases I discussed. But
even if there were a virtue that we can manifest by being undercondent, it would not follow
that undercondence can be an epistemic virtue. It is more natural to regard undercondence
as sometimes good but not epistemically good.
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Some ethicists writing on modesty already hold this view.28 It is also worth noting that
ethicists who deny that modesty requires epistemic vice do so on the basis of an alternative
account of modesty on which it does not require underestimation of self-worth (e.g., Brennan
(2007)), and indeed some locate modesty upstream of any doxastic attitude (e.g., Bommarito
(2013)). So while these ethicists don’t think moral and epistemic virtues conict, they also don’t
think that undercondence is a virtue of any kind.
A second reason to add is that we may also be confusing Discretion with one of the ver-
sions of epistemic permissivism that I mentioned at the outset. I have nothing to say against
a version of epistemic permissivism that says that a single person can at dierent times hold
dierent attitudes on the same evidence without epistemic irrationality. Because I think epis-
temic rationality is not determined solely by evidence but also by competence, I suspect that
such a view is true. Over time, we might acquire competences that enable us to rationally be-
lieve more on the basis of the same evidence. Before we acquired these competences, it might
have been epistemically rational to be agnostic on questions that it is no longer epistemically
rational to be agnostic on, even if our evidence is the same. It doesn’t follow that agnosticism
was epistemically rational given sucient evidence. Suciency might itself be a function of
competence, so that the same evidence that was insucient before is sucient now.
There are other reasons why this diachronic permissivist view might be true. Consider
someone who believes p on the basis of sucient evidence at t but who begins to worry about
error possibilities at t+ and through worrying loses her condence in the suciency of the
evidence. There is something to the thought that this person cannot epistemically rationally
believe p at t+ given her doubts.29 There is also something to the thought that agnosticism at
t+ would be epistemically rational. Of course, if we accept these thoughts, there will also be
pressure to deny that the person’s evidence is still sucient at t+. So we are not granting that
a person could be rationally agnostic in spite of having sucient evidence.
Still, so understood, this diachronic permissivism is also easily confused with Discretion.
But it is distinct from Discretion, which is a synchronic thesis and needs to be a synchronic
thesis for reasons noted at the outset.
How much of a concession would it be to grant that this diachronic permissivism is true? I
think it would be no concession at all, for reasons that I will turn to explain: this view cannot
play the role that Discretion was supposed to play in the Argument from Discretion.
Before I proceed to defend this claim, I want to make one more observation about this
diachronic permissivism. Note that the fact that one has doubts about the suciency of the
evidence is itself a piece of higher-order evidence. What we should say about the rational
impact of one’s doubts will turn on whether we accept a level-bridging or a level-splitting
view of higher-order evidence. If we split levels, we should also split statuses: given unjustied
doubts, agnosticism would be merely blameless given the total evidence. If we bridge levels,
we should deny that the total evidence at the later time is still sucient to rationalize belief.
But either way, the view we end up holding is not really one on which dierent attitudes at
dierent times could be epistemically rational given the same evidence. For reection on the
status of the evidence generates higher-order evidence. So this view is not a diachronic version
of Discretion, though it is still worth calling “permissivist” in its level-bridging form.
28See especially Driver (1989) and (2000).
29For discussion of this thought that I embrace, see Pryor (2004). Pryor invokes Broome’s notion of a wide scope
requirement (though with qualications about the language of “scope”) to explain these cases. He suggests that even
if someone unjustiably believes that the evidence for p is insucient, this person would be violating a requirement
of rationality if she believed p under these conditions. He also suggests that we should distinguish this notion of
rationality from the notion of justication. So this view wouldn’t vindicate a diachronic version of Discretion, since
agnosticism here wouldn’t attain the same epistemic status that belief would minus the higher-order doubt. I myself
am tempted to say that the person’s evidence ceases to be sucient here, precisely because this person is not in a
position to form a doxastically rational belief.
19
5 The Implications for the Argument from Discretion
This much is obvious: if Discretion is false, the Argument from Discretion is unsound. The
conclusion might be true anyway. But the people who developed the argument should still be
worried. For they believe that even if it we were able directly decide to form several alternative
doxastic attitudes, this ability would not constitute a signicant form of doxastic control if it
required epistemic irrationality. I think they are right: a doxastic freedom worth having would
not require epistemic irrationality. They hoped to secure more by showing that we can decide
to go several ways without epistemic irrationality. If Discretion is false, we lack that ability. If
so, we lack what struck them as necessary for a signicant form of doxastic control.
There might still be such a thing as doxastic freedom. But if my assessment is right, we
cannot require for doxastic freedom that it be open to us to form various coarse-grained dox-
astic attitudes without epistemic irrationality. If so, our model of doxastic freedom will have
to become more similar to the models of free will proposed by compatibilists who reject the
Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Several defenders of epistemic freedom pursue such a
model.30 Since I believe in epistemic freedom, I take the failure of the Argument from Dis-
cretion to count in favor of their model. Here is not the place to defend their model. But the
conditional is still signicant: if we have epistemic freedom, we need a compatibilist model.31
I will return to this moral. But in the remainder of this section, I want to consider a direct
way that a defender of the Argument from Discretion could respond. The response is to argue
that even if Discretion is false, there is a weaker analogue of Discretion that can play the same
role. I think that this response fails, but it is an important response to consider.
To bring out why I think this response cannot work, it will be instructive to consider a
version of this response that proponents of the argument should agree won’t work. I take it
that the following weaker thesis cannot play the role that Discretion played:
(Permissible Oblivion) For innitely many propositions p, it is not epistemically irrational for
one not to believe p or ¬p even if one has sucient evidence to settle whether p.
Permissible Oblivion does not help to ground an interesting form of direct doxastic control for
familiar reasons. For Permissible Oblivion does not support the thought that we can without
epistemic irrationality directly decide to believe. I can in a way decide without epistemic irra-
tionality whether or not I believe propositions for which I have sucient evidence: I can decide
whether or not to consider those propositions. If I consider them, it is likely that I will come
to believe them. If I don’t, I will probably not come to believe them. But having the ability to
decide to believe in this manner is compatible with my lacking direct control over my beliefs.
After all, if the propositions are obviously true, belief will arise automatically once I consider
these propositions; it would take redirection of my attention to new evidence, self-deception,
or irrationality to “unbelieve” it. If these propositions are not clearly true, belief will wait until
they strike me as suciently clear unless I am epistemically irrational.
Proponents of the Argument from Discretion will recognize these points and agree that
Permissible Oblivion cannot play the role that Discretion plays in their argument. The question
is whether they can do better.
One alternative is to use the claim that it is tempting to mistake for Discretion—viz., PRS.
But PRS is no more helpful than Permissible Oblivion. Recall the two permissions that PRS
gives us. PRS rationally permits us to hold no attitude on p when considering whether p in the
hope of settling whether p. PRS also rationally permits us to believe if the evidence is sucient.
To make use of that second permission without epistemic irrationality, a person must be sat-
ised that the evidence is sucient. If an epistemically rational person is not satised that the
evidence is sucient, she cannot just decide to believe. This inability is unsurprising, since she
30See, for example, Ryan (2003), Hieronymi (2008), and Steup (2008, 2012).
31McHugh (2014) defends such a model. He should rely solely on this model and reject the Argument from Discre-
tion.
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is not satised that she is in a case where belief is epistemically rational. Once she is satised
that the evidence is sucient, she can no longer resist belief without epistemic irrationality.
Notice that PRS accommodates this case: it merely says that resistance is not irrational when
one is considering the question whether p in the hope of settling it. An epistemically rational
person is no longer considering the question in the hope of settling it when she is satised that
the evidence is sucient for a specic answer to it.
So PRS cannot play the role Discretion was supposed to play. The only obvious alternative
is to appeal to a dierent version of epistemic permissivism. But the options are limited. It will
not help to appeal to an interpersonal permissivism on which dierent subjects can permis-
sibly hold dierent doxastic attitudes to p given the same evidence. That view is compatible
with a wholesale intrapersonal impermissivism. It also will not help to appeal to a synchronic
moderate intrapersonal permissivism, since it implies Discretion.
What about a diachronic intrapersonal permissivism that says that a single individual can
permissibly hold dierent coarse-grained doxastic attitudes given the same evidence at dier-
ent times? Properly understood, this view will also not help. To see why, recall the reasons
why this view may seem plausible. One reason is the thought that rationality isn’t merely a
function of the evidence but also a function of externalist factors, such as competence, that
can change over time. We can’t acquire competences at will, and even if we could, it wouldn’t
follow that we have a signicant form of direct doxastic control. The control would still be
indirect: we rst change something about our epistemic circumstances that makes it rational
to believe (or become agnostic) and we believe (or become agnostic) thanks to this change.
Externalism about rationality isn’t the only reason why diachronic permissivism can seem
plausible. Again, if a person comes to have doubts about the suciency of the evidence, it
might then seem to become rational for her to go agnostic even though the rst-order evidence
on the basis of which she had rationally believed is unchanged.
But even if diachronic permissivism were plausible for this reason, we still would get no
support for an interesting form of direct doxastic control. After all, it is only once the person
comes to have doubts about the suciency of the evidence that agnosticism allegedly becomes
rational. And it is implausible that whether we doubt the suciency of the evidence is some-
thing over which we have direct control. Obviously, one can entertain possible doubts about
the suciency of the evidence. That is easy. But one may or may not react by coming to share
these doubts. Indeed, whether one does come to share them is not plausibly something that
one can control directly. In any case, even if it were possible to doubt the suciency of the
evidence for p directly, it wouldn’t follow that one’s doxastic attitude toward p is under one’s
direct control. The change of one’s attitude toward p that this doubt occasions would be auto-
matic and not—or not obviously—under one’s direct control. So diachronic permissivism also
can’t plausibly play the same role that Discretion played.
It would be rash to conclude that nothing important can be learned from cases in which
we change our mind because we come to have doubts about the suciency of the evidence.
Exercising our ability to change our mind in response to doubts we have might still seem to be a
way in which we exercise doxastic responsibility. But if it is, it is because this ability is a special
case of our more general ability to change our mind in response to good reasons. The upshot
is just further evidence for a reasons-responsive compatibilism about doxastic responsibility.
That conception of doxastic responsibility casts doubt on relevance of having multiple at-
titudes open to us at a given time. For we do not need the ability to hold multiple attitudes
in order to have and manifest reasons-responsiveness. The conclusion to draw is as old as the
Meditations:
[I]n order to be free, there is no need for me to be capable of going in each of two directions; on
the contrary, the more I incline in one direction—either because I clearly understand that reasons
of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost
thoughts—the freer is my choice.32
32Descartes (1641/1996: 40).
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If we understand freedom in terms of reasons-responsiveness, it shouldn’t matter whether
the evidence sometimes gives us slack. We could manifest doxastic control without epistemic
irrationality even if no alternative attitudes are open to us, normatively or psychologically.
We can now see the deeper problem with the Argument from Discretion. If Discretion
struck us as relevant to the question of direct doxastic control, it is because we recognize
that the kind of direct doxastic control worth desiring wouldn’t require epistemic irrationality.
But this recognition should lead us to recognize that being able to move in several directions
without epistemic irrationality is unnecessary for doxastic control.
Of course, we might still want the ability to move in several directions anyway. But we
shouldn’t think that this ability is necessary for the signicant kind of doxastic control. That is
precisely because the signicant kind of doxastic control is the kind that involves the exercise
of our rational capacities. For those capacities can still be exercised in cases where we have
only one option. Indeed, as some have noted, having more than one option psychologically
open to us could undermine our freedom, by showing us to lack self-control.33 If so, the desire
for options and the desire for the kind of control that essentially involves the exercise of our
rational capacities are competing desires. Yet they are combined by defenders of the Argument
from Discretion. For that reason, the argument is an unstable one.
6 Concluding Remarks
Let’s recap. I began by attacking two arguments for Discretion. According to the rst, Dis-
cretion is a consequence of the fact that we are never required to believe what the evidence
supports. This is a bad argument for Discretion because it turns on conating agnosticism
with the mere absence of belief. The fact that one is not epistemically irrational in lacking
belief does not show that agnosticism is permitted, since the absence of belief is compatible
with the absence of agnosticism. In cases where one considers a proposition that is obviously
suciently evident (e.g., that horses do not speak English) and responds to it with agnosticism,
we nd that to be an undercondent response.
According to the second argument, Discretion is supported by cases where the evidence is
sucient but not conclusive (e.g., big lizard testimony). I observed rst that to the extent that
it is intuitive in these cases that one is rationally agnostic about the relevant factual proposition,
it will be plausible that one is not really condent that the evidence is sucient. If one is
fully condent that the evidence is sucient (which is hard to believe in cases like big lizard
testimony), it will again seem like one is not fully rational in responding with agnosticism.
I suggested that these data are best explained by the negation of Discretion. This suggestion
was encapsulated in the Argument from Undercondence.
Having found more evidence against Discretion than for it in considering cases of sucient
but inconclusive evidence, I turned to oer another direct argument against Discretion. I rst
suggested that we need a story about the nature of agnosticism that explains why it is under-
condent to believe outright that the evidence is sucient while responding with agnosticism.
While I did not give an analysis of agnosticism, I suggested that the best explanation of this da-
tum is that agnosticism about p requires settled resistance to believing p and to disbelieving p
on one’s evidence. I suggested that this is a natural thing to think about capital-‘A’-agnosticism,
and that we should generalize from that case. I then showed that if we do, we get an argument
against Discretion. For on this type of account, agnosticism and belief oppose each other in a
way that makes it impossible to have sucient reason for each.
Of course, this left us without much of an explanation of why we found Discretion attrac-
tive. So I gave an error theory: we confuse a permission to be agnostic on p with a permission
to hold no attitude on p even while considering the question whether p in the hope of settling
it, which I called the Prerogative of Reective Silence (PRS). This error theory explains why
33See Weatherson (2008: 545-6) and Ryan (2003: 63-4).
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one might be led astray by the two arguments discussed earlier in the paper. While one might
respond by saying that PRS is all we needed anyway, this claim is wrong. PRS cannot do the
work that Discretion has been asked to do. We cannot replace Discretion with PRS and thereby
repair the Argument from Discretion.
At the very least, I hope to have shown that Discretion is much less plausible than it may
seem and that the Argument from Discretion is seriously awed. While other arguments for
Discretion might be forthcoming, they would have to grapple with the diculties I raised and
avoid the conations that lie behind the obvious arguments. It would be modest to forbear
from declaring Discretion false. But I think we have sucient reason to disbelieve it. So, if we
take any doxastic attitude towards it at all, it ought to be disbelief. It shouldn’t be agnosticism.
As I stressed several times, the conclusion of the Argument from Discretion might be true.
Indeed, I think there is a real insight about doxastic control that drives the Argument from
Discretion. But I also think there is a mistake that drives the argument. The insight is that the
kind of doxastic control worth wanting will be a kind that is consistent with the exercise of
our rational capacities. The mistake is the thought that doxastic control requires the ability to
form a range of dierent attitudes. While there might be reasons for wanting that ability, we
do not need it to have a signicant kind of doxastic control. That ability might even hinder
doxastic control by reecting an underlying lack of self-control. Elsewhere I hope to defend
these claims about doxastic control. For now, I recommend not mixing these two requirements
on doxastic control. Mixing them leads to further mistakes, like the Argument from Discretion.
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